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Abstract: 
We hypothesize that the increase in expectation about future technological change decreases the 
likelihood for the purchase of new assets because the change may make the new assets obsolete. To 
test this hypothesis, we use patents and citations data to represent the expected technological 
change. We find that the purchases of and the amount spent on used assets increase with the 
expectation of technological change; while time to completion of the purchase and the number of 
bids decrease with the increase in expectations about technological change.  We exploit industry 
deregulations to establish identification. In contrast to the literature, we find no empirical support 
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 We investigate whether the purchase of used assets is more likely when an industry is undergoing 
significant technological change. A used asset is an asset that one firm divests and another purchases. 
Between 1980 and 2013, firms traded $3.1 trillion worth of used assets, reflecting the significance of 
this market. In this strand of the literature, the key reason why firms purchase used assets is because 
of financial constraints (see Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007). The argument is that the cheaper price of the 
used asset motivates the financially constrained firm to purchase this asset. No doubt, this argument 
explains the behavior of some firms; however, most of the firms in the United States are not financially 
constrained and they account for the vast majority of the purchases of used assets. The literature puts 
forward an alternate explanation based on the expectations about the future changes in technology. 
Rosenberg (1976) argues that the decision to adopt a new technology is influenced by the expectation 
that this new technology will be a substantially improved substitute for the current technology. The 
firm might then not purchase the current cutting edge technology because this technology might 
become obsolete soon (see also Farzin, Huisman, and Kort, 1998). Thus, the result should be an 
increase in the purchase of older technology to fill the firm’s immediate needs. 
We build on this insight from the literature on technological expectations by hypothesizing that 
increases in the expectations about future significant technological changes increase the perceived 
obsolescence of new assets. This perception results in the decrease in the cost of purchasing used assets. 
This decrease results in firms spending more on used assets than new assets as they wait for the 
substantially improved new technology to emerge. We also hypothesize that as the economic life of 
the used asset decreases, the firms try to extract the maximum out of their purchases by decreasing the 
time taken to complete the transaction.  
An incentive to the firm to adopt new technology is that it can charge a premium from its 
customers. Absent this incentive, the firm prefer to purchase cheaper used assets. We further 
hypothesize that industries with regulations that limit competition and have some control over the 
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prices they charge their customers might also prefer used assets. Examples of these regulated industries 
include industries that generate, transmit and distribute electricity, industries that transmit and 
distribute natural gas, etc. 
We empirically test these hypotheses with data from SDC for the sample years 1980 to 2013. 
For the expected technological change, we use two measures. The first measure uses annual patent 
applications as an ex-ante proxy for the expected technological change because these applications can 
result in new technology. The drawback of this measure is that many patent applications are frivolous. 
So, the second measure uses the citations of the patents. The rational is that the important patents are 
likely to be cited more often.  
In support of our hypothesis, we find that there is a positive relation between the purchase of 
used assets and the expected change in technology. We also find that the value of the purchased assets 
decreases with the increase in the expected change in technology. These results indicate that the 
expected change in technology decreases the price of the used asset that in turn results in more used 
assets being purchased. Furthermore, we estimate a negative relation between the time to completion 
and the expected technological change. This result indicates that the expected technological 
obsolescence leads the firm to quickly incorporate a used asset so that it can enjoy the asset’s economic 
life longer. Lastly, we use industry deregulations to identify the technological change. In contrast to 
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) and Rampini (2015), in our empirical tests we find no support for financial 
constraint as an explanation for the firm’s decision to purchase used assets.  
 The rest of this paper is as follows. We review the literature and develop the hypothesis in 
Section 2. Section 3 contains descriptions of the data and the construction of the variables. Section 4 
presents the empirical results in support of our hypothesis. We conclude in Section 5.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
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The financial constraints of the firm (see Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007) is the prevalent 
explanation in the literature for why firms purchase used assets. The other explanations in the 
literature are productivity changes (Warusawitharana, 2008; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001) and 
leasing as a substitute to purchase of assets (Chemmanur et al. 2010).  A less investigated 
explanation in the corporate finance literature comes from the theory on technological 
expectations. This paper investigates the last reason for purchase of used assets.  
 
A. Expectations of technological change 
In neoclassical economics, a technological shock (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) is one of the 
most important ingredients in explaining an outcome observed in nature (see Schumpeter, 1934). 
Andrade and Stafford (1999) find that industry characteristics such as technological changes and 
capacity utilization are strongly associated with acquisitions and capital expenditures. When firms face 
a new technology, neoclassical theory argues that firms should adopt the new technology. However, 
empirically the literature finds that not all technological shocks result in the adoption of new 
technology. Rosenberg (1976) explains this phenomenon by arguing that expectations about “the 
timing and significance of future improvements” play an important part in the firm’s decision to adopt 
a new technology. The key part of Rosenberg’s argument is that many firms prefer not to adopt the 
new technology if the technology is likely to significantly change in the future. In other words, the 
expectation that a new and more efficient technology might be introduced tomorrow might affect the 
decision to adopt a new technology today.  
The adoption of a new technology is costly. Rosenberg (1976) explains this costliness as the 
uncertainty generated “by further improvement in the technology whose introduction is now being 
considered.” Another source of costs is that the adoption of the new technology that can lead to 
disruption either through learning-by-doing or a gestation lag. To reduce these costs, the firm might 
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decide to wait for the significant improvement by purchasing an older technology. Used assets are 
more likely to have older technology, so the hypothesis follows.  
H1a: The firm is more likely to purchase used assets if the firm expects significant future improvements 
in the technology.  
 Similarly, because the firm expects better technology in the future, it increases the fraction of 
expenditures spent on used assets.  
 H2a: The expenditure on used assets increases as the expectations about significant changes to future 
technology increases. 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that the firm employs the used asset in the interim 
between the current technology and the next major innovation. Hence, the asset’s economic life is 
likely to be short. Thus, the purchasing firm has an incentive to complete the deal as quickly as possible.  
H3a: The time taken to complete the purchase of the used asset is shorter if the firm expects significant 
future improvements in technology. 
 In the above discussion, the firm has two options: it can postpone the investment decision or 
purchase the technology today. Thus, the true total demand equals the latent demand plus the observed 
purchases. Further, in terms of supply, the higher the expectations of technological change the larger 
the availability of the used asset because of exits from the industry. For instance, if technological 
change occurs in a series of incremental steps, then the exits at each step will ensure a continuous 
supply (however, if a firm enters to take advantage of the expected change, then most likely it already 
has a superior technology that it wants to exploit and thus might not need to buy the used asset). Hence, 
the most likely scenario is that the expectations of technological change increase supply more than 
demand, which results in a decrease in the competition for the used asset.  
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H4a: The number of bids for the used asset is lower if the purchaser expects significant future 
improvements in its technology. 
 According to Hicks (1935; page 8) monopolists tend to enjoy the “quiet life.” In this view, 
monopolists like to avoid innovations. The reason being that monopolists can maintain their economic 
rents without undertaking the hard work that innovations involve. In regards to the hypotheses in this 
paper, the adoption of a newer technology takes more effort than the adoption of older technology. In 
addition, the adoption of a used asset decreases the existing profit margins less than the adoption of a 
new asset because new technology is costlier. Thus, monopoly firms are more likely to purchase used 
assets. In the United States the federal government provides certain industries with monopoly 
protection through regulations. The impact of the four hypotheses should be stronger for these 
regulated industries.  
 
B. Financial constraint 
 The second strand of the literature explains the purchase decision through the financial 
constraint of the firm (e.g., see Rampini, 2015; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2007). A new asset has a large 
upfront cost (i.e., purchase price), while an older asset has costs staggered over time (i.e., maintenance, 
downtime, etc.). Hence, firms that cannot pay the upfront cost prefer to buy used assets. Eisfeldt and 
Rampini (2007) hypothesize that financially constrained firms purchase used assets. 
H1b: The firm is more likely to acquire vintage technology than new technology if its financial 
constraint increases.  
Similarly, the amount spent by a financially constrained firm on the purchase of a used asset 
increases with financial constraint.  
H2b: The expenditure for the used asset increases as the financial constraint of the purchaser increases. 
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If the firm is financially constrained it might need more time to line up finances.  
H3b: The time taken to complete the purchase is longer if the purchaser is financially constrained. 
The financial constraint of the acquirer has no implication about the competition for the asset.  
H4b: The number of bids for the vintage technology is not affected by the financial condition of the 
acquirer. 
The difference between both these theories is as follows. First, if the rate of change in 
technology is the main driver, then there should be more purchases of used assets by firms in industries 
with a faster rate of technological change. In contrast, the constraint theory argues that the purchases 
of used assets should be higher in financially constrained firms. Second, if the rate of change in 
technology is the main driver, then the firms will allocate larger amounts to purchase used assets than 
new assets because of technological obsolescence; if the cost is the main driver then financially 
constrained firms will also employ more used technology than new technology. Third, the time to 
completion of the purchase should decrease if the rate of expected technological change increases. In 
contrast, the financial constraint of the firm should lead to a shorter time to completion. The reason is 
that for the financially constrained firm, it should take a longer time to line up financing for the 
purchase. Lastly, in regulated industries the firms are more likely to purchase used technology because 
the costs of acquiring new technology is higher than the price benefits from purchasing the new 
technology. The financial constraint of the firm should not have any impact on the relation between 
the firms’ decision to purchase the used technology and the product market competition for the asset. 
The above arguments are summarized in Table 1.  
{Please insert Table 1 about here.} 
 
C. Other explanations 
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In this subsection, we consider two other explanations for the purchase of used assets. The first 
explanation is from the productivity theory (see Warusawitharana, 2008; Yang, 2008). This theory 
argues that firms move to their optimal size by buying and selling assets. Less productive firms sell 
assets, and firms that are more productive buy assets. As argued by Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), 
firms adjust in size until the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of production. 
Productivity is empirically measured by ROA, and the firm’s efficiency is measured by Q. Thus, 
firms that are more efficient are less leveraged and purchase used assets, which contradicts the 
financial constraint theory. However, productivity generally fails to explain the heterogeneity in the 
time to completion, the number of bids, or the fraction of total expenditures spent on used 
technology. 
The second explanation is that used assets are leased and not purchased directly from the 
seller. The traditional explanation is that some firms have a tax advantage in leasing and so 
optimally indulge in leasing (see Miller, and Upton, 1976). More recently, Chemmanur et. al. (2010) 
suggest that leases emerge as a solution to a two-sided information asymmetry problem. On the one 
hand, the manufacturer has private information about the quality of the product. On the other hand, 
the user of the good has private information about the payments that they can make each period. 
The model can explain the buy versus lease decision and the lease prices. However, it does not 
explain when a firm will purchase new or used assets. This paper answers a different question and 
so is a little distant from the leasing literature.  
  
III. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
This section describes the data sources that we use to test the hypothesis. The data on used 
assets is from SDC Platinum’s domestic mergers and acquisitions database. This data set contains 
comprehensive information about the sale of operating units by different firms. The SDC Platinum 
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reports the data on the sale of a subsidiary and also reports the sale of assets by the firm. Both of these 
are considered used technology (see Warusawitharana, 2008). We clean the data by removing the sales 
of assets by firms that go bankrupt. The reason is that these are likely to be fire sales and so might not 
be reflective of the general population of firms. The sample period is for the years 1980 to 2013 and 
only includes firms based in United States. Table 2 reports the statistics. The firms take about 50 days 
to conclude a transaction and an average of one bid for each of these transactions takes place. Figure 
1 presents the percentage of firms listed on Compustat that purchase used technology. The figure shows 
that the purchases of used technology follows a pattern. The maximum percentage of firms that 
purchase used technology is in the years 1999 and 2000. This percentage coincides with the stock 
market boom. Additionally, when the stock market increases between 2003 and 2008, the percentage 
of firms purchasing used assets also increases. This percentage indicates that the purchases of used 
technology follow stock market booms and busts and not the reverse as implied by the financial 
constraint explanation.  
{Please insert Figure 1 about here.} 
To measure the expectations about technological changes, an ex-ante measure is required that 
predicts possible future changes. Counting the annual number of patents granted to an industry is a 
good measure because it reflects the likelihood that future technological changes will follow in that 
industry. There is generally a lag of a few years between a patent and the emergence of a new 
technology. Thus, patents are a signal of future technological changes.  
The source for the patent and citation data is NBER. As part of the patent data, NBER also 
identifies the firms that are publicly listed and gives their identifying information, such as their gvkeys. 
We take the number of patents that all firms in a particular industry are granted in a year. This measure 
captures the rate of technological change in that industry (see also Grimpe and Hussinger, 2007). The 
yearly sum of patents granted is divided by the average number of patents granted to all firms in that 
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industry for the preceding three years (i.e. t-1 to t-3). Table 2 reports that the average for the above 
number is 1.05.  
We also count the annual number of citations received by the patents of all firms in a particular 
industry. A concern with any citation-based measure is that it has a truncation bias, that is older patents 
are likely to accumulate more citations over time than patents that the firm has recently applied for. 
This bias becomes significant when the patents are weighted by the total number of citations they 
receive. Our citation measure is not affected by this bias because we are not considering the total 
number of citations received by the patent, instead we are considering the total number of citations 
received by the patent stock for that industry in a particular year. Again, we divide the citations by the 
average received in the preceding three years. Table 2 reports that the patents are on average cited 0.91 
times. Both of these measures might capture some industry effects. However substantial technological 
innovations affect the entire industry and so an industry level variable is more appropriate. For 
example, Apple introduced the smart phone; the impact was felt across the industry and this new 
technology changed the mobile phone industry substantially. Additionally, some firms in an industry 
might work independently on similar research projects that leads to homogeneity in the technical 
change in the industry. Again, an industry level variable captures this change.  
{Please insert Table 2 about here.} 
In corporate finance, the Kaplan and Zingales and Whited and Wu indices are well-accepted 
measures of financial constraint. Table 2 shows that the average value for the Kaplan and Zingales 
index is 0.0278. Similarly, the average value for the Whited and Wu index is -0.2101. According to 
Whited and Wu (2006) both values represent least constrained firms. The Herfindahl index of the 
average industry in the sample has a value of 0.17.  The US department of Justice considers the 
Herfindahl index’s values of 0.15 and 0.25 to be that of a moderately concentrated industry and 
indicates that the firms in these industries and are likely to draw closer scrutiny for anti-competitive 
behavior if they acquire another firm in the same industry. The size of the acquirer is the natural 
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logarithm of the total assets of the firm. The average value as reported in Table 2 is 4.6477, this size is 
larger than that of the average firm in Compustat. This result is similar to those reported in 
Warusawitharana (2008) who finds that large firms tend to acquire more used assets.  
Tobin’s Q measures the growth opportunities of the firm and is measured by the market value of 
the assets of the firm to its book value as provided in the balance sheet of the firm. Table 2 shows that 
the average firm has a Q value of about 1.65 and is comparable to the average firm in Compustat. Table 
2 indicates that the cash flows of the average firm are positive, which suggests that the managers of 
profitable firms choose to grow their firms through trading in used assets. The leverage as measured 
by the ratio of total liabilities and total assets is about 0.42. Welch (2011) finds that the average firm 
has 61% of its total assets in total liabilities. Thus, the firms in our sample are less levered on average 
than other publicly traded firms.  
 
A. Testing Strategy 
To test the hypotheses, we estimate the following regression: 
𝑦௜.௧ାଵ= 𝛼 + 𝛽ଵ𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛾𝑋௜,௧ + 𝜀௜,௧… (1) 
In equation (1), the dependent variable y is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm 
purchases used assets. Technological Change is measured by patents and citations. Financial Constraint 
is measured by the Kaplan and Zingales and Whited and Wu indices. The literature finds that the other 
measures of financial constraint like z-scores and the investment cash-flow sensitivity measure 
financial constraint imprecisely and therefore, we do not use them in this paper (see Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). The rest of the controls are firm specific. 
Warusawitharana’s (2008) productivity explanation argues that firms with more ROA and of larger 
sized use more used assets. So, we include ROA and size as controls. We also include Q as a 
measure of efficiency as in Warusawitharana (2008). Jensen (1986) suggests that cash flow is a good 
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proxy for the principal-agent conflict in a firm. Leverage not only reflects the financial health of the 
firm but also can reduce the agency conflict in a firm. The reason is that debt and the fixed payments 
associated with it impose discipline on the managers. The sample consists of a set of control firms 
matched on size, cash flow, and year. 
   
IV. RESULTS 
A. The determinants of purchasing used assets 
We hypothesize that firms purchase more used assets if the rate of technological change 
increases. Table 3 shows the results. Column (1) contains positive and statistically significant estimates 
for the Patents. Patent applications can represent the amount of innovation and technical change in an 
industry. The reasoning is that the firm is more likely to purchase a used asset if the industry’s patent 
count increases. Column (2) contains positive and statistically significant estimates for the Citations. 
These estimates indicate that firms are more likely to purchase used assets if the citation count in the 
industry increases. Citations are a proxy for the importance of the inventions in the industry. Therefore, 
if the industry’s inventions are more significant, then the firms in that industry purchase more used 
assets.  
{Please insert Table 3 about here.} 
 Columns (3) and (4) show the estimates for financial constraint. Both the Kaplan and Zingales 
coefficients in Column (3) and Whited and Wu coefficients in Column (4) are not statistically different 
from zero. Thus, the financial constraint might not be the reason why the firm is purchasing used assets. 
The estimate for Leverage also supports this observation. The negative relation between the purchase 
of used assets and leverage shows that firms that have less book liability are more likely to purchase 
used assets. The results show that the purchase of used assets is not driven by the financial constraint 
of the purchaser as suggested by a vast strand of the literature.  
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 In terms of other variables, the estimates for size in Columns (1) through (4) are positive. These 
estimates indicate that larger firms are more likely to purchase used assets. The Q is also positive and 
statistically significant in each of the four columns. The reason might be that the firms with higher 
growth opportunities choose to grow by acquiring used assets. The estimates for cash flow are also 
positive and statistically significant.  
Panels A and B in Table 4 provide a robustness test to the above results. In Panel A we split 
the sample based on size in which smaller firms that are compared to the industry median size are in 
the odd numbered columns, and larger firms that again are compared to the industry median are in the 
even numbered columns. The first two columns report the results when the key independent variable 
is Patents, while the last two columns report the results when the key independent variable is Citations. 
The panel displays that the estimates for Patents in the second column and the estimates for Citations 
in the fourth column are statistically significant. This significance indicates that larger firms are more 
likely to purchase used assets than smaller firms. The reason might be that the larger firms are more 
willing to wait for the significant improvement in technology than smaller firms. Alternately, for larger 
firms, new technology is costlier because larger firms tend to be more complex and so changing one 
asset affects other parts of the firm. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients for the odd numbered 
columns are statistically insignificant. Smaller firms are likely to be more financially constrained, and 
therefore the lack of statistical significance indicates that the financial constraint of the firm is not 
likely to be a factor in the purchase of used assets.  
{Please insert Table 4 about here.} 
An underlying assumption in the hypothesis on expected technological change is that firms 
reallocate assets for optimal use. Pulvino (1998) finds that purchasers from a different industry than 
the seller purchase used assets and use these assets less efficiently. To test this finding, we separate the 
sample based on the SIC codes of the sellers and purchasers. The results are reported in Panel B of 
Table 4. The odd numbered columns report the estimates when the sellers and the purchasers are from 
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different industries, while the even numbered columns report the results when the purchasers and 
sellers are from the same industry. The estimates for Patents and Citations in the even numbered 
columns are statistically significant. The reason is that the firms reallocate the used assets to firms in 
the same industry when expectations of technological change are higher. The lack of statistical 
significance in the odd numbered columns indicates that the purchasers from different industries are 
not likely to purchase used assets when the expectations for technological change increase.  
 
B. Expenditures on used technology 
 This subsection tests the second hypothesis by investigating the expenditures for used 
technology. The empirical model is the same as that in equation 1. The only difference is that the 
dependent variable is now the fraction that the firm spends on purchasing used assets in relation to its 
total capital expenditures. Table 5 shows the results. The first column reports that the estimate for 
Patents is positive and statistically significant. Thus, we can say that if the number of patents filed by 
the industry increases then the firms in those industries spend a larger fraction of their total capital on 
used assets. The second column reports the estimate for citations per patents for all of the firms in that 
industry. This relation is positive and statistically significant.  It means that the fraction of capital spent 
to purchase used assets increases if the average patent in that industry has an increase in citations. 
Because the number of citations can represent the importance of the inventions, if the industry has 
more important expected technical innovations, then these lead to an increase in the fraction of capital 
spent to purchase used assets.  
{Please insert Table 5 about here.} 
 Columns (3) and (4) show that the estimations of Kaplan and Zingales and Whited and Wu are 
not statistically significant.  These results show that the financial constraint of the purchaser does not 
affect the fraction spent on purchasing used assets. In terms of other variables, the Q is positive and 
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statistically significant.  We can conclude that high growth purchasers spend more on purchasing used 
assets.  
Table 5 provides a robustness test for the results in Table 3. The criticism for the dependent 
variable used in Table 3 is that it does not capture the significance of the purchase to the firm involved. 
One way of capturing this significance is to divide the dollar amount spent on purchasing used assets 
by the dollar value that the firm spends on maintaining and acquiring assets. If the purchase of used 
assets is the fraction of the capital expenditures of the firm, then this fraction reflects the importance 
of the purchases of used assets in relation to the firms existing assets. Therefore, in Table 5 we change 
the dependent variable to reflect this difference.   
 
C. Time to completion 
 The third hypothesis states that the time taken to complete the purchase is likely to be shorter 
if the expected rate of technological change increases. To test this hypothesis, we use a regression 
model in which the dependent variable is now the time taken to complete the purchase. We report these 
results in Table 6. Column (1) reports a negative and statistically significant relation at the one percent 
confidence level between time to completion of the purchase and patents. This relation indicates that 
the time taken to complete the purchase, starting from the announcement day, decreases as the rate of 
expected technological change increases. Column (2) reports a negative and statistically significant 
relation between the time to completion and citations. This relation shows that the time to completion 
of the purchase decreases as the importance of the patents in the purchaser’s industry increases.  
{Please insert Table 6 about here.} 
 Columns (3) and (4) show the relation between time to completion of the purchase and the 
financial constraint of the purchasing firm. Both of these estimates are not statistically significant. 
Thus, the financial constraint of the firm is not likely to have a significant impact on the time taken for 
it to complete the purchase. In terms of other variables, larger firms are more likely to complete the 
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purchase faster. The negative relation between the time to completion and cash flow indicates that 
firms with low cash flow are likely to take more time to complete the transaction.  
 
D. Number of bidders for used assets 
Next, we test hypothesis four by using the number of bids for each purchase. Panel A of Table 
7 reports the results. In Column (1), the coefficient for Patents is negative and statistically significant. 
This result shows that the number of bids for the purchase of used assets declines if the firm is in an 
industry that has more expected technological change.  The estimated coefficient for Citations in 
Column (2) is negative and statistically significant at the one percent confidence level. This coefficient 
indicates that as the significance of the expected technical change increases the competition for the 
used assets declines. This finding provides additional support for the fourth hypothesis and shows the 
robustness of the empirical result from a different dependent variable.   
{Please insert Table 7 about here.} 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 provide estimates of the coefficient for financial constraint. 
The estimates of the Kaplan and Zingales index and the Whited and Wu index are both statistically 
insignificant. The results show that the financial constraints of the purchaser do not play a role in its 
decision to bid on competitive used assets. In terms of other variables, the positive relation between 
the number of bids and size indicates that large firms are more likely to bid on competitive used assets. 
The negative relation between the number of bids and cash flow means that firms with relatively lower 
cash flows are more likely to bid on used assets.  
The assumption underlying the fourth hypothesis is that the supply of used assets increases and 
that increase reduces the competition for the used assets; hence, the lower number of bids.  One way 
to test this assumption is to use the dollar amount of the used assets sold. Compustat provides this 
amount. Thus we make the dependent variable the logarithm of the dollar value of property plant and 
equipment sold divided by the lagged total assets of the firm. The results are presented in Panel B of 
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Table 7. The estimates for Patents in Column (1) and the estimates for Citations in Column (2) are 
positive and statistically significant. These findings indicate that as the expectations of technological 
change increase firms divest more and more assets.  
 
E. Regulated markets and the purchase of used assets 
 This subsection tests the hypothesis that firms in regulated industries are also more likely to be 
purchasers of used assets. Our investigation first identifies the leading regulated industries. These 
industries provide a good test as to whether their firms are less competitive because of the regulations. 
Further, some of these firms might have a monopoly in certain geographic regions because of local 
regulations.  
{Please insert Table 8 about here.} 
Column (1) of Panel A in Table 8 shows the number of times used assets are purchased; 
Column (3) shows the number of times used assets are sold by firms in that industry. The last row 
provides the total for all of the industries listed in the table. Column (1) shows that the total number of 
purchases for these regulated industries is more than the number of sales for used assets (Column (3)). 
Column (2) reports the dollar value of purchases for these industries while Column (4) reports the 
dollar value of the sale of these assets for these industries. The totals reported in the last row show that 
the dollar value of the purchases of used assets is more than that of the sale of used assets. Thus, the 
regulated industries are net buyers of used assets. 
 
F. Identification 
Identification can remove any concerns about endogeneity and can establish causation. This 
process is important because the hypotheses suggest that these affects will be stronger in regulated 
industries because the firms in these industries might have monopoly power. Therefore, we test the 
hypothesis by examining the variables before and after deregulation. Panel B of Table 8 lists the 
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industries and the years of deregulation. Deregulation is exogenous to the firm because it is passed by 
Congress. Broadly, transportation, energy, and telecommunication are regulated industries that 
experience deregulation shocks. These deregulations are staggered over time; this time effect is 
important because it reduces the impact of any correlated event occurring simultaneously with the 
deregulation.  
 For a difference-in-difference regression, our control group is matched by cash flow, size and 
year dimensions. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 8. The variable of interest is the 
interaction term of Deregulation (deregulation is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for two 
years prior to deregulation and zero for two years after the deregulation) and Regulated Industry. In 
the first column, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant that indicates that before 
deregulation, the firms in the regulated industry purchased more used assets. In Column (2), the 
estimate of the interaction term is positive. The implication is that the fraction of expenditure on used 
assets is higher before deregulation. In Column (3), the estimate of the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant. This term indicates that before deregulation the number of bids received for 
the used assets is lower. In the last column, the estimate of the interaction term is negative. This term 
means that before deregulation the time taken to complete the deal was also shorter. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis and so establish that the results are not biased by endogeneity.  
 
G. Difference-in-difference estimation for financial constraint 
 A potential reason for why we find no statistical significance for the financial constraint 
variables is because of identification issues. We use the great recession of 2008 to establish 
identification. The great recession of 2008 is a macroeconomic financial shock caused by the banking 
industry and so is exogenous to the other firms in the economy. The firms after the recession are 
generally more financially constrained than before the shock because the banks tightened the lending 
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standards. Thus, the effect from financial constraint should be stronger after the recession than before 
it.    
{Please insert Table 9 about here.} 
 The difference-in-difference method can exploit the great recession and remove concerns about 
endogeneity. The results are reported in Table 9. The difference-in-difference estimators are the 
interaction terms between the Constraint Dummy and Whited Dummy in odd numbered columns and 
between the Constraint Dummy and KZ Dummy in even numbered columns. If the financial constraint 
is the cause, then these interaction terms should be statistically significant. In Columns (1) through (6) 
none of the interaction terms is statistically significant. The interpretation of the estimate is that 
financial constraint is not the likely cause behind the purchase of used assets.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This research investigates the decisions by firms to purchase used assets. We argue that the 
expectations about future technological changes delay the purchase of new assets and result in the 
purchase of used assets. As the expectations about the change in technology increases the obsolescence 
of assets of different vintages, the price of used assets declines as the expected rate of change in 
technology increases. The time to completion of the purchase decreases as the expected rate of change 
in technology increases because the lifespan of used assets declines with the expected rate of 
technological change. Finally, we hypothesize that firms in regulated industries are more likely to 
purchase used assets because the cost of adopting new assets outweighs their benefits.  
We empirically test these hypotheses by using patent and citation data to measure the expected 
rate of technological change. The empirical evidence supports the hypotheses and is robust to different 
specifications. An alternate explanation is that the financial constraint of the firm explains the decision 
to purchase used assets. We include measures of financial constraint in our empirical specification, and 
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in each of these estimates we find no statistical support. We infer that the decision by the firms to 
purchase used assets is explained by the expected rate of change in technology.  
This research contributes to the literature by investigating why firms purchase used assets. This 
is important as firms purchase assets regularly and spend vast amounts of resources to do so. Future 
research can investigate the relation between the long-term performance of the firm and the purchase 
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Figure 1) Time Series of the Percentage of Firms Purchasing Used Assets 
 










Table 1 Hypothesized Relations      
Relations Purchase Expenditure Time Bids 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Expected Technological Change + + - - 
Regulated Industry + + - - 
Financial Constraint + + + +/- 
The above table summarizes the hypotheses of the expected technological change theory and financial constraint 
theory. Purchase refers to the firms’ decision to purchase used assets. Expenditure is the fraction that the firm spends 
on used assets. Time refers to the time taken for the purchaser to complete the acquisition. Bids refer to the number 
of bids received by the seller of the used assets. The first row presents the hypothesis on Expected Technological 
Change. The second row presents hypothesis in relation to regulated industries and is a subset of Expected 
Technological Change. The third row presents the hypothesized relation between Financial Constraint and the 




































Table 2 Summary Statistics 
  Mean Standard Deviation Observations 
  (1) (2)   
Deal Value 13.3144 340.3708 13,439 
Number of Bids 1.0094 0.1442 13,439 
Time to Completion 50.2313 80.6133 13,439 
Patents 1.0532 0.3242 26,878 
Citations 0.9084 0.4257 26,878 
Kaplan Zingales 0.0278 2.0474 26,878 
Whited Wu -0. 2101 0.0388 26,878 
Herfindahl Index 0.1729 0.1808 26,878 
Size  4.6477 2.725 26,878 
Q 1.6501 0.387 26,878 
Cash Flow 0.0112 0.0334 26,878 
ROA 0.0301 0.6503 26,878 
Leverage 0.4203 0.2821 26,878 
 
In row 4 onwards the number of observations is 26,878 that reflects that the sample consists of firm-years with used 
assets (13,439 observations) and a matched sample of firms. The firms are matched on size, cash flow, and year. The 
Deal Value is the transaction value divided by the total sale. The Number of Bids is the total number of bids per sale 
of used assets. The Time to Completion is the total time taken in days from the announcement of the purchase to its 
completion. Patents are the total number of patents granted by that three-digit industry in that year divided by the 
average number of patents granted to that industry for the three prior years (i.e. year -1 to year -3). The Citations are 
the total number of citations received by the patents applied for in that year for that industry. Again, they are divided 
by the average number of citations for that industry over the last three years. This measure captures the importance of 
the innovations in that year. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is a measure of financial constraint and is scaled by 100. 
Whited and Wu (2006) is a measure of financial constraint. The Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of each firm in an industry. The market share is the firm’s sales divided by industry sales. Size is the 
log of total assets of the purchaser. Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm’s assets (market capitalization plus 
total liability) divided by the total assets of the firm. The Cash Flow is EBITDA/total assets. The ROA is net 
income/total assets. The Leverage is the total liabilities divided by total assets. 
26 
 
Table 3) Determinants of Purchasing Used Assets 
Used Asset Purchase Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patents 0.0127    
 0.0026**    
Citations  0.0131   
  0.0017**   
Kaplan Zingales   0.0001  
   0.0009  
Whited Wu    0.0107 
    0.0191 
Size 0.01 0.0099 0.0117 0.0102 
 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0005** 
Q 0.0025 0.0025 0.003 0.0024 
 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
Cash Flow 0.0394 0.0394 0.0405 0.0349 
 0.0031** 0.0031** 0.0031** 0.0032** 
ROA 0.0553 0.0553 0.0587 0.0495 
 0.0039** 0.0040** 0.0039** 0.0040** 
Leverage -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0003 
 0.0004 0.0004* 0.0004** 0.0004 
Constant 0.0089 0.0116 -0.0967 -0.058 
  0.0101 0.0102 0.0115** 0.0113** 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 
The table uses 26,878 observations. The Used Asset Purchase Dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if the firm purchased vintage used asset. The table uses Probit regressions. The robust standard errors are clustered by 
firm and are reported in the line below the estimate. The year and firm dummies are used but not reported. The * and 
** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4 Sorting on Characteristics for the Purchase of Used Assets 
Panel A Sorting on Firms Abnormal Size 
Firm Assets-Median Industry 
Assets <0 >=0 <0 >=0 
Used Asset Purchase Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patents 0.0024 0.004   
 0.0027 0.0013**   
Citations   0.0026 0.0045 
   0.002 0.0018* 
Size 0.0103 0.0071 0.0103 0.007 
 0.0005** 0.0010** 0.0005** 0.0010** 
Q 0.0014 0.0106 0.0014 0.0106 
 0.0001** 0.0013** 0.0001** 0.0013** 
Cash Flow 0.0208 1.1308 0.0208 1.0892 
 0.0026** 0.5011* 0.0026** 0.5102* 
ROA 0.0273 1.2073 0.0273 1.1664 
 0.0033** 0.5040* 0.0033** 0.5130* 
Leverage 0.0003 -0.0205 0.0003 -0.0203 
 0.0003 0.0049** 0.0003 0.0050** 
Constant 0.017 0.0738 0.0175 0.0743 
  0.0080* 0.0192** 0.0079* 0.0187** 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.17 
Observations 12,758 14,120 12,758 14,120 
The variables are as defined in Table 2. The robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in the line 
below the estimate. The year and firm dummies are used but not reported. The  * and ** represent statistical 
significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Panel B Sorting on Non-Industry Purchasers 
Different Industry Purchaser Yes No Yes No 
Used Asset Purchase Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patents 0.0026 0.013   
 0.0026 0.0027**   
Citations   0.0031 0.0132 
   0.0029 0.0018** 
Size 0.0078 0.0104 0.0005 0.0103 
 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0007 0.0005** 
Q 0.0014 0.004 0 0.004 
 0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0003** 
Cash Flow 0.0149 0.093 0.0011 0.0926 
 0.0026** 0.0103** 0.0023 0.0103** 
ROA 0.0199 0.1212 0.0009 0.1208 
 0.0033** 0.0115** 0.003 0.0115** 
Leverage -0.0009 -0.0058 -0.0005 -0.0058 
 0.0003** 0.0011** 0.0003 0.0011** 
Constant 0.0241 0.0607 0.0084 0.011 
  0.0112* 0.0102** 0.015 0.0106 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.13 
Observations 6,295 20,583 6,295 20,583 
Different Industry Purchaser is “Yes” if the purchaser and seller have different four-digit SIC codes; if the purchaser 
and the seller have the same four-digit SIC code then the first row has “No.” Variables are as defined in Table 2. The 
robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in the line below the estimate. The year and firm dummies 




Table 5 Expenditure on Used Assets 
% Used Asset Purchase  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patents 0.0121    
 0.0016**    
Citations  0.0119   
  0.0011**   
Kaplan Zingales   0.0001  
   0.0001  
Whited Wu    0.0107 
    0.0132 
Size -0.0006 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0026 
 0.0004 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
Q 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0014 
 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
Cash Flow 0.0167 0.0285 0.0305 0.0244 
 0.0036** 0.0025** 0.0024** 0.0025** 
ROA 0.0246 0.0416 0.0454 0.0365 
 0.0041** 0.0031** 0.0030** 0.0031** 
Leverage -0.0025 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0012 
 0.0004** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003** 
Constant -0.049 -0.02 -0.0341 -0.0132 
  0.0030** 0.0062** 0.0069** 0.0061* 
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.03 
The table uses 26,878 observations. The % Used Asset Purchase is a ratio where the amount the firm paid for 
purchasing vintage used asset is divided by the sum of capital expenditure. The robust standard errors are clustered 
by firm and are reported in the line below the estimate. The year and firm dummies are used but not reported. The * 
and ** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6 Time Taken to Complete the Purchase 
Time to Completion (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patents -4.4359    
 1.4040**    
Citations  -2.4083   
  1.4035*   
Kaplan Zingales   -7.5663  
   17.0411  
Whited Wu    24.1842 
    14.2994 
Size 3.6608 3.7405 3.2054 3.4081 
 0.3709** 0.3705** 0.3762** 0.4156** 
Q -0.2617 -0.2641 -0.3628 -0.1066 
 0.2004 0.2005 0.207 0.2057 
Cash Flow -26.6845 -27.1148 -29.1082 -25.9477 
 14.5143 14.5512 13.4591* 18.5987 
ROA -35.4712 -36.1508 -39.9851 -33.4896 
 15.5682* 15.6015* 15.1157** 19.4546 
Leverage 3.6719 3.6686 6.2024 3.3082 
 1.8503* 1.8507* 2.3286** 1.7952 
Constant 12.3921 13.5988 95.4562 3.0692 
  3.4340** 3.3720** 57.2629 15.6282 
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
The table uses 13,439 observations. Time to Completion is the number of days taken between the announcement of 
the deal and the date on which the deal is effective. The dependent variables are as defined in Table 2. The robust 
standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in the line below the estimate. The year and Fama French industry 
dummies are used but not reported. The * and ** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7 Supply of Used Assets 
Panel A Number of Bids for Used Assets 
Number of Bids (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patents -0.0153    
 0.0053**    
Citations  -0.0054   
  0.0017**   
Kaplan Zingales   0.0113  
   0.0078  
Whited Wu    0.0786 
    0.0688 
Size 0.007 0.007 0.0044 0.0071 
 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0009** 0.0013** 
Q 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 
 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 
Cash Flow -0.0312 -0.031 -0.0138 -0.0148 
 0.0123* 0.0123* 0.0095 0.0137 
ROA -0.0461 -0.046 -0.024 -0.0267 
 0.0153** 0.0153** 0.0119* 0.0178 
Leverage -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.001 -0.0009 
 0.0019 0.0019 0.0013 0.0024 
Constant 0.9547 0.9545 0.9672 0.9648 
  0.0077** 0.0078** 0.0067** 0.0089** 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.08 
The panel uses 13,439 observations. The Number of Bids is the total number of bids for the purchase. The dependent 
variables are as defined in Table 2. The robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are reported in the line below 
the estimate. The year and Fama French industry dummies are used but not reported. The * and ** represent statistical 




Panel B) Sale of Used Assets 
Ln(Sale of PPE/AT) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Patents 0.0003    
 0.0001**    
Citations  0.0004   
  0.0002**   
Kaplan Zingales   -0.0001  
   0.0001  
Whited Wu    -0.0035 
    0.0017* 
Size -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 
 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0000** 0.0001** 
Q -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004 
 0.0001** 0.0002** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
Cash Flow 0.0083 0.0082 0.0078 0.0079 
 0.0020** 0.0020** 0.0019** 0.0020** 
ROA -0.0115 -0.0114 -0.0113 -0.0111 
 0.0022** 0.0022** 0.0021** 0.0022** 
Leverage 0.0014 0.0013 0.001 0.0009 
 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
Constant 0.0069 0.0058 0.0147 0.0169 
  0.0009** 0.0008** 0.0007** 0.0008** 
Adj. R2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
This panel uses13,439 observations. Ln(Sale of PPE/AT) is the natural logarithm of the dollar value of the sale of 
property plant and equipment (Compustat data item code: SPPE) divided by the lagged dollar value of the total asset 
(AT) of the firm. The dependent variables are as defined in Table 2. The robust standard errors are clustered by firm 
and are reported in the line below the estimate. The year and Fama French industry dummies are used but not reported. 
The * and ** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 8 Industry Characteristics of Purchasers of Used Assets 
Panel A Regulated Industries 
SIC Buy Sell 
Code Description Number $ Million Number $ Million 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
491 Electric  336 108,387 306 114,520 
492 Natural Gas 345 77,336 289 73,638 
495 Sanitary 297 14,939 259 13,730 
493 Electric & Natural Gas Other  104 35,494 36 10,619 
494 Water Supply 98 8,285 95 6,204 
Total 1,180 244,441 985 218,711 
Buy means the buying of used assets by the three-digit SIC industry. Sell means the selling of used assets by the three- 
digit SIC industry. Number refers to the number of times the SIC code firm has bought/sold used assets. The $ Value 
is the total value of all used assets bought/sold by the three-digit SIC firm.  
Panel B List of Major Deregulations during Sample Years  
  Year Industry 
1 1982 Bus Regulatory Reform Act 
2 1984 Ocean Shipping Act 
3 1986 Surface Freight Forwarder Deregulation Act 
4 1989 National Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act 
5 1992 Energy Policy Act 
6 1994 Federal Aviation Authorization Act (especially surface transport part) 
7 1996 Telecommunications Act 
8 1998 Ocean Shipping Reform Act 
The list of industries is from www.wikipedia.org. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Deregulation  0.1795 -2.956 0.3875 170.1557 
 0.3796 3.1375 0.255 44.3892** 
Regulated Industry 0.2923 -0.8552 0.8552 0.8319 
 0.1183* 0.3681* 0.3681* 0.3803* 
Regulated Industry* 0.305 1.2013 -0.2203 -119.9512 
Deregulation  0.1127** 0.4737* 0.7452** 23.5684** 
Kaplan Zingales 0.7436 -6.7443 -0.108 -105.2888 
 0.5209 6.3675 0.1424 239.4946 
Whited Wu -0.2184 -20.3062 1.0335 -572.3445 
 0.2346 20.7757 1.0056 672.5207 
Size 0.0713 0.2928 0.014 -16.5081 
 0.0091** 0.1039** 0.0045** 7.9415* 
Q 0.027 0.1692 -0.0007 -9.7574 
 0.0063** 0.0666* 0.0027 7.8684 
Cash Flow 1.2002 -4.3073 -0.227 161.8443 
 1.654 35.3028 0.8029 97.6472 
ROA 1.9772 -5.1538 -0.2984 0.4854 
 1.6728 35.3517 0.8147 0.4841 
Leverage -0.0623 -0.082 -0.0092 132.0531 
 0.0668 0.4865 0.0134 69.8632 
Constant -2.3786 0.6341 0.5463 -16.1073 
  0.4735** 1.479 0.2689* 61.1978 
Adj. R2 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.17 
Deregulation is a dummy that takes the value one for two years prior to deregulation, and zero for two years after 
deregulation. Regulated industries are those industries that experience the deregulations shock and are listed in Panel 
A. The control group is matched on size, cash flow, and year. The first column reports Probit estimates, the rest of the 
columns report OLS estimates. The year and industry dummies are used but not reported. The * and ** represent 
statistical significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9 Difference-in-Difference Estimation to Test Financial Constraint as an Explanation of 
Purchase of Used Assets 
  Used Asset Purchase Dummy % Used Asset Purchase Time to Completion 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constraint 
Dummy -0.9432 -0.901 -5.4306 -39.8959 -2.6921 0.9559 
 0.0606** 0.0651** 36.2655 33.2308 5.5154 5.9273 
Whited 
Dummy 0.017 
 -12.8114  -0.655  
 0.0438  9.8508  3.9579  
Constraint 
Dummy 0.067 
 -29.1563  1.5145  
*Whited 
Dummy 0.0894 
 33.6522  8.7663  
KZ Dummy  0.184  -46.3867  0.3035 
  0.0331**  13.9098**  2.4453 
Constraint 
Dummy 
 -0.0858  59.9022  -7.7262 
*KZ Dummy  0.0586  43.3707  5.1752 
Size 0.1052 0.1036 6.5165 7.5684 3.5122 3.489 
 0.0068** 0.0069** 3.3491 3.4646* 0.6982** 0.6988** 
Q 0.0193 0.0141 1.5538 3.097 -0.3597 -0.3656 
 0.0039** 0.0042** 2.3347 2.4368 0.3852 0.3887 
Cash Flow 1.2035 1.4018 277.7705 876.613 56.5603 57.1332 
 0.3101** 0.3359** 236.5313 248.4801 21.4480** 21.4804** 
ROA 1.6224 1.8576 298.0206 903.5379 76.9549 77.5273 
 0.3791** 0.4121** 236.9351 750.3074 28.0785** 28.1080** 
Leverage -0.0758 -0.0984 -1.1616 -13.4295 -2.1059 -2.3778 
 0.0464 0.0572 13.9755 14.8624 2.6493 2.6497 
Constant 2.2105 2.2722 17.8081 23.047 4.6692 4.4628 
  0.2049** 0.2037** 31.8526 32.0473 5.229 5.3515 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.12 0.12 
Obs. 53,756 53,756 53,756 53,756 53,756 53,756 
Probit regressions are used in Columns (1) and (2), and an OLS method is used in Columns (3) through (6). The 
Constraint dummy takes the value of one for years 2009 and after. The Whited Dummy takes the value of one if the 
firm has a financial constraint greater than the median. Similarly, the KZ dummy takes the value of one if the firm has 
a Kaplan and Zingales value greater than that of the median. The year and industry dummies are used but not reported. 
The * and ** represent statistical significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 
